Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule

Clinton Gubong Gassi () and Frank Steffen
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Clinton Gubong Gassi: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Frank Steffen: Universität Bayreuth [Deutschland] = University of Bayreuth [Germany] = Université de Bayreuth [Allemagne]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify the multi-winner voting rules that can be considered as extension of the Plurality rule. Multi-winner voting addresses the problem of selecting a fixed-size subset of candidates, called a committee, from a larger set of available candidates based on the voters' preferences. In the single-winner setting, where each voter provides a strict ranking of the candidates and the goal is to select a unique candidate, Yeh (2008) characterized the Plurality rule as the only voting rule satisfying five independent axioms: anonymity, neutrality, consistency, efficiency, and top-only. In this paper, we demonstrate that a natural extension of these axioms to the multi-winner framework allows us to identify a class of top-k counting rules as multi-winner analogous to the Plurality rule.

Keywords: Multi-winner; voting rules; axioms; Plurality rule; top-k counting rules. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04730571

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