q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules

Clinton Gubong Gassi () and Eric Kamwa ()
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Clinton Gubong Gassi: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Eric Kamwa: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: This paper introduces the q-fixed majority property for committee selection rules, which extends the traditional fixed majority principle to a flexible framework. We examine conditions under which the committee scoring rules satisfy the q-fixed majority property. Focusing on (weakly) separable rules, we find that the Bloc rule is the only which satisfies it for all q > 1/2. In addition, the q-bottom majority property is introduced, highlighting conditions under which committees can be excluded based on voter consensus.

Keywords: Voting; Multiwinner elections; Committee scoring rules; q-fixed majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04730580

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