A new approach to agglomeration problems

Adriana Navarro-Ramos ()
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Adriana Navarro-Ramos: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Universidade de Vigo

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Abstract: In this paper, we study a location problem with positive externalities. We define a new transferable utility game, considering there is no restriction on the transfer of benefits between firms. We prove that the core of this game is non-empty, provide an expression for it, and an axiomatic characterization. We also study several core allocations, selected by means of a certain bankruptcy problem.

Keywords: location problem; positive externalities; cooperative game; core; axiomatic characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01-29
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04919375v1
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