What are the determinants of permanent and temporary non take-up of the French minimum social benefit?

Cyrine Hannafi and Rémi Le Gall ()
Additional contact information
Cyrine Hannafi: UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers, LéP [Poitiers] - Laboratoire d'économie de Poitiers - UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers
Rémi Le Gall: TETRAS - Laboratoire de sociologie des Territoires, du travail, des âges et de la santé - UL - Université de Lorraine

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We investigate the determinants of non-take-up of the French minimum social benefit (Revenu de Solidarité Active [RSA], Active Solidarity Income) using the Tax and Social Income Survey and distinguishing between people in situations of either permanent or temporary eligibility. We use the monthly dimension of the dataset in order to study the dynamics of non-take-up. We find that poverty levels in the department of residence and having two or more children decrease the probability of RSA non-take-up, in cases where individuals are permanently or temporarily eligible while professional inactivity, having rental resources and being in a couple increase the likelihood of submitting a claim in both cases. In the case of permanent eligibility, we find that RSA non-take-up in a given quarter increases the probability of non-take-up in the following quarter. Moreover, the amount of the RSA, the level of sanctions, residing in a priority district and the "back and forth" between claimants and social agencies are important factors affecting non-take-up in the case of permanent eligibility while take-up for the Activity Bonus and social agencies' credibility in delivering accurate and reliable information, are salient in the temporary eligibility case.

Date: 2025-03-31
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05010935v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05010935v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05010935

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().