Mediation Design by an Informed Party

Andrés Salamanca ()
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Andrés Salamanca: Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice

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Abstract: This paper examines mediation design by an informed party—the expert—who selects a mediation mechanism at the interim stage, i.e., after observing her private information. We consider a basic strategic model in which the expert's information corresponds to a binary state of the world, and an uninformed decision-maker must choose an action on the real line. The parties have different preferred outcomes in each state. Our framework is closely related to the informed-principal problem, and we build on the theoretical foundations developed in that literature. We provide a complete characterization of all perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the interim mediation design game. We then refine this set using the solution concepts of strong solution, core mechanisms, neologism proof equilibria, and neo-optimum.

Keywords: neologism proof; neo-optimum; strong solution; core mechanism; information provision; informed principal; mediation design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-08
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