Stress Testing Approval Mechanisms in Public Good Games

Koffi Serge William Yao, Emmanuelle Lavaine () and Marc Willinger ()
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Koffi Serge William Yao: CERIIM - Centre de Recherche en Intelligence et Innovation Managériales - Excelia Group | La Rochelle Business School
Emmanuelle Lavaine: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Marc Willinger: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: We stress test the approval mechanism with the minimum disapproval benchmark (AM) in public good games, extending previous two-player analyses (Masuda et al., 2013, 2014) to a three-player setting. This introduces challenges in vote aggregation, addressed through a comparison of unanimity and majority approval rules. We find that AM is less efficient in the three-player case. While it fully implements optimal contributions in BEWDS for two players (Masuda et al., 2014), implementation in the three-player game depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR). Only unanimity with low MPCR yields the Pareto optimum; other rule-MPCR combinations result in null contributions, as in the voluntary contribution mechanism (Isaac and Walker, 1988). Nevertheless, this partial implementation remains relevant, as many real-world public goods have low MPCR (Weimann et al., 2012).

Date: 2025
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