Regulation, Compliance, and Proximity: Evidence from Nuclear Safety

Mario Daniele Amore (), Chloé Le Coq () and Sebastian Schwenen ()
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Mario Daniele Amore: Università Bocconi, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
Chloé Le Coq: CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, SSE - Stockholm School of Economics
Sebastian Schwenen: TUM - Technische Universität Munchen - Technical University Munich - Université Technique de Munich, MISES - Mannheim Institute for Sustainable Energy Studies - University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim

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Abstract: Safety performance varies widely across firms, even in high-risk industries with strict regulatory standards. Using administrative data from U.S. nuclear power plants, we find that variation in safety outcomes partly reflects inspector allocation: less experienced inspectors are disproportionately assigned to facilities located farther from regional regulatory offices. This spatial sorting has meaningful economic consequences: doubling inspector experience increases staff emergency training scores by 0.3 percentage points, corresponding to avoided revenue losses of approximately USD 1.2 billion annually for the industry. These findings highlight how internal organizational dynamics within regulatory agencies can weaken the consistency and effectiveness of oversight.

Keywords: Geography; Training; Regulation; Nuclear Plants; Compliance; Safety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-pantheon-assas.hal.science/hal-05296622v1
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