EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Measuring Coalition Power in a Fragmented Parliament: A Shapley-NOMINATE Analysis of the 2022-2024 French Elections

Zouhair Ait Benhamou () and Sylvain Baumann ()
Additional contact information
Zouhair Ait Benhamou: EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université, NU - Normandie Université, FAI - Université Le Havre Normandie - Faculté des Affaires Internationales - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université
Sylvain Baumann: EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université, FAI - Université Le Havre Normandie - Faculté des Affaires Internationales - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In 2022 and 2024, French parliamentary elections have not yielded a stable winning coalition, successive governments had to rely on ad hoc majorities as a result. We combine the Shapley-Shubik model with fuzzy coalition commitment and a Poole-Rosenthal ranking in order to show that there are unstable coalitions that form among the three main blocs, but: a) ideological distances preclude many potential coalitions, b) the restricted core of feasible winning coalitions inflates the bargaining power of smaller parties and groups and c) Coalescing into a larger caucus does not guarantee a larger Shapley value.

Keywords: Coalitions; Shapley-Shubik index; NOMINATE Scaling method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://normandie-univ.hal.science/hal-05300251v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://normandie-univ.hal.science/hal-05300251v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05300251

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2026-02-10
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05300251