Removing Behavioral Barriers to Energy Renovation: A Discrete Choice Experiment

Corinne Chaton (), Valérie Lesgards and Samy Zitouni
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Corinne Chaton: EDF R&D SEQUOIA - EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF [E.D.F.] - EDF – Électricité de France, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Valérie Lesgards: EDF R&D SEQUOIA - EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF [E.D.F.] - EDF – Électricité de France
Samy Zitouni: EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF [E.D.F.] - EDF – Électricité de France, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: Through a discrete choice experiment conducted among French homeowners, we determine whether easing financial constraints through two financing programmes (third-party financing and Energy Efficient Mortgages) leads to an increase in the adoption rate of energy-efficient renovations. We examine whether the introduction of a contractual mechanism that intrinsically promotes trust between the parties (one-stop-shop) can increase the adoption rate.Among other things, our study reveals certain preferences among households with regard to financing energy-efficient home renovations and assesses certain cognitive biases. We find that both financing programmes increase the probability of choosing an energy renovation over the opt-out option. Nevertheless, participants exposed to the mortgage programme have a preference for the status quo (not renovating), unlike those exposed to third-party financing.With the latter financing programme, the effectiveness of the work seems guaranteed, unlike with the mortgage. This explains why the group offered the energy-efficient mortgage is more inclined to choose renovation scenarios that include an administrative facilitator, highlighting the importance of procedural support and risk transfer in the decision-making process.

Keywords: Discrete Choice Experiment; Energy-Efficient Renovation; On-bill financing; Energy Efficient Mortgages; One-stop-shop (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10-14
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