Copyright claims and revenue allocation on streaming platforms

David Lowing

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study how to allocate the revenue generated by content that incorporates copyrighted material from other creators. We develop a model of copyright-based revenue allocation with overlapping claims and propose the Equal Rights rule, which divides the revenue from each contested unit of content equally among all creators holding a claim to it. We provide three independent axiomatic characterizations of the rule, built on principles directly relevant to the environment of streaming platforms. Using a cooperative game-theoretic approach, we define content creation games that capture revenue generation under copyright constraints. We show that the Equal Rights rule always produces Core-stable allocations in these games, while maintaining properties that set it apart from the Shapley value.

Keywords: Revenue allocation; Copyright claims; Axiomatic design; Cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05454295v5
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05454295

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32780.99206

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