Copyright claims and revenue allocation on streaming platforms

David Lowing ()
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David Lowing: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes

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Abstract: This paper examines how to allocate the revenue generated by content creation on streaming platforms when creators may hold overlapping copyright claims over the work of others. We develop a stylized model of such environments and propose the Equal Rights allocation rule. We provide two axiomatic characterizations of this rule based on principles directly relevant to our setting. Using a cooperative game-theoretic approach, we define content creation games that capture revenue generation under copyright constraints. We show that the Equal Rights rule always produces Core-stable allocations, while maintaining properties that set it apart from the Shapley value.

Keywords: Revenue allocation; Copyright claims; Axiomatic design; Cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05454295v1
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05454295

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32780.99206

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