Buying Components

Bruno Jullien (), Matthieu Bouvard () and David Martimort ()
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Bruno Jullien: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Matthieu Bouvard: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
David Martimort: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We study how the organizational structure of producers affects competition between systems. We model systems as differentiated bundles of complementary components, where components within each system are produced either by a single firm (integration) or by two distinct firms (disintegration). When information about buyers' preferences is symmetric, disintegration typically increases prices and reduces total welfare as the less efficient system gains market share relative to integration. In addition, when buyers' preferences are private information, disintegration magnifies the quality distortions suppliers introduce to screen buyers and further reduces the market share of the more efficient system. Overall, the analysis suggests that technological standards that facilitate the combination of components from different suppliers can have adverse effects.

Keywords: Composite goods suppliers organization competition double marginalization. JEL codes. D82; Composite goods; suppliers organization; competition; double marginalization. JEL codes. D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01-16
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05461307v1
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