Cooperative games with unpaid players

Sylvain Béal (), Léa Munich (), Philippe Solal and Kevin Techer ()
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Sylvain Béal: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Léa Munich: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
Kevin Techer: UMLP - Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We consider cooperative TU-games with unpaid players, which are described by a TUgame and two categories of players, paid and unpaid. Unpaid players participate in the cooperative game but are not rewarded for their participation, for instance for legal reasons. The objective is then to determine how the contributions of unpaid players are redistributed among the paid players. To meet this goal, we introduce and characterize axiomatically three values that are inspired by the Shapley value but differ in the way they redistribute the contributions of unpaid players. These values are unified as instances of a more general two-step allocation procedure.

Keywords: Unpaid players; Shapley value; Harsanyi dividends; axioms; two-step procedure; Priority value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09
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