One-Sided Enforcement in a Model with Persistent Adverse Selection

David Martimort and Aggey Simons
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David Martimort: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Aggey Simons: Unknown
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Aggey Semenov

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Abstract: We study a repeated buyer-seller relationship with persistent adverse selection and one-sided enforcement, where a prepaid seller can breach by taking the money and running. The optimal stationary contract depends on enforcement strength and the discount factor. Three regimes arise. With a strong legal system, penalties deter breach and the optimal static contract can be repeated. With a weak system, the penalty caps transfers, forcing bunching among efficient (low-cost) types. With a very weak system, compliance relies on relational rents, causing large downward distortions. Strengthening public enforcement relaxes both incentive and enforcement constraints, reducing allocative inefficiency.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Limited enforcement; Relational contracts; Contract breach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-02
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