Dynamic equilibrium with randomly entering and exiting firms of different types

Pierre Bernhard (), Romain Biard () and Marc Deschamps
Additional contact information
Pierre Bernhard: MACBES - Modélisation et commande de systèmes biologiques et écologiques - Centre Inria d'Université Côte d'Azur - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IPMC - Institut de pharmacologie moléculaire et cellulaire - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur - ISA - Institut Sophia Agrobiotech - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
Romain Biard: LMB - Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Besançon (UMR 6623) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: There exist situations where firms (identical or not) are in a state of renewed interaction and where, at each period, in addition to exits, new firms (identical or not) may arrive. In such cases, no one is able to know ex ante exactly how many firms there will be in each period. One of the questions an incumbent firm might therefore ask itself, in this context, is what expected payoff it can expect. Our paper aims to provide an answer to this question, in finite and infinite horizons, using a discrete-time dynamic game with random arrival(s) and exit(s) of different types of firm(s). We first propose a general model, which we then particularize by considering the types as composed of identical players. Within this framework, we address the case of a dynamic Cournot oligopoly with sticky prices, and provide numerical illustrations to underline the interest of this approach and demonstrate its operational character.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Random entries and exits; Types; Dynamic equilibrium; Cournot; Sticky prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic equilibrium with randomly entering and exiting firms of different types (2025)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05494442

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().