Strategic Communication of Economic Opportunities with Externalities

Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan and Mathieu Faure
Additional contact information
Mohamed Belhaj: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Frédéric Deroïan: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Mathieu Faure: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: A subset of economic agents in a society is aware of the existence of an economic opportunity, and compete to exploit the opportunity. We study incentives to communicate about the existence of this economic opportunity when the exploitation of the opportunity by the winner generates externalities to other agents. We characterize the equilibria of the communication game and identify conditions under which more externalities generate more communication.

Keywords: Opportunity; Strategic Communication; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05504606v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05504606v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05504606

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().