On Best-Worst Voting Rules

Eric Kamwa ()
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Eric Kamwa: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We provide complete axiomatic characterisations of the best-worst voting rules, under which each voter assigns a fixed positive weight α to each of her top p alternatives and a fixed negative weight −β to each of her bottom q alternatives. This family encompasses, as special cases, the one-best one-worst rules of García-Lapresta et al. (2010), the half accepted-half rejected rule of Mahajne and Volij (2018), the bloc rules, plurality and antiplurality. We prove four complementary characterisation theorems, covering the general weighted rule and the symmetric basic rule for arbitrary group sizes, with and without continuity. The logical independence of the axioms is established in each case.

Keywords: Scoring rules; Best-worst voting; Axioms; Cancellation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05617719

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