Access Pricing and Network Quality in Rail Transport

Tarification d’accès et qualité du réseau dans le transport ferroviaire

Philippe Bontems, Marie-Françoise Calmette and David Martimort
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Philippe Bontems: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Marie-Françoise Calmette: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
David Martimort: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies access pricing in a vertically separated railway sector where the infrastructure manager sets access charges and chooses network quality, while downstream operators choose transport services. The model characterizes the inefficiencies of unregulated vertical separation and then derives optimal regulation with and without public transfers. When transfers are constrained, access charges follow a Ramsey logic modified by downstream market power and by cross-effects among long-distance operators. Under asymmetric information, the relevant access cost is no longer the physical marginal cost but a virtual cost that incorporates the information rents of the infrastructure manager and the traffic consequences of incentive constraints.

Keywords: Access pricing; Railroad regulation; Vertical separation; Infrastructure quality; Asymmetric information; Mechanism design; Information rents; Régulation ferroviaire; Tarification d’accès; Rentes informationnelles; Asymétrie d’information; Qualité de l’infrastructure; Séparation verticale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-04
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