Fair Allocations of Joint Team Production

Wataru Kitano, David Lowing () and Satoshi Nakada
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Wataru Kitano: Tokyo University of Science
David Lowing: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes
Satoshi Nakada: Tokyo University of Science

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Abstract: We study how to allocate the value created by joint team production when output is realized only if all teams are involved in the cooperation. We model this environment as TU-games with coalition structures, together with a feasibility constraint requiring a coalition to include at least one member from each group. Within this class, we propose a family of allocation rules that interpolates between marginalism and egalitarianism within groups. Our key axiom, weak joint monotonicity, links each individual's payoff to two solidarity components as well as to her own marginal contributions: the grand-coalition value and the value generated by other groups. Combined with standard axioms, weak joint monotonicity characterizes the constrained egalitarian Owen values, which generalize the in-group egalitarian Owen values to constrained coalition structures. We also relate the model to TU-games with diversity constraints and consider extensions to general representation quotas and overlapping team memberships.

Keywords: Coalition structures; Diversity constraints; Owen value; Shapley value; Monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-08
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