Data Sharing, Privacy, and Innovation in Healthcare

Chiara Canta, Anna D’annunzio and Yassine Lefouili
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Chiara Canta: TBS - Toulouse Business School
Anna D’annunzio: Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata [Roma, Italia] = University of Rome Tor Vergata [Rome, Italy] = Université de Rome Tor Vergata [Rome, Italie], TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CSEF - Centre of Studies in Economics and Finance - UNISA - Università degli Studi di Salerno = University of Salerno - NEOLAiA - NEOLAiA European University = Université Européenne NEOLAÏA
Yassine Lefouili: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We study the impact of privacy regulation on data-driven innovation and welfare in the healthcare sector. A platform providing medical services (e.g., a hospital) collects patient data and may sell non-rival access to downstream innovators. Without data externalities, consent can induce inefficiently low data sharing because the platform cannot identify privacy-concerned patients and captures only part of the social value of innovation. Consequently, requiring consent can reduce welfare for intermediate privacy costs. When one patient's disclosure reveals information about others, consent decisions become strategic complements. These externalities reduce the compensation required for disclosure and can instead produce excessive sharing, potentially justifying additional restrictions on compensation or data sharing. If the platform controls innovator access, consent can induce excessive restrictions without data externalities, whereas sufficiently strong externalities can lead the platform to admit too many innovators.

Keywords: Data sharing; privacy; consent policy; innovation; healthcare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-15
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