Mieux allotir les réseaux régionaux à partir de nouveaux résultats sur les rendements d'échelle ferroviaires

Julien Lévêque ()
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Julien Lévêque: LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper analyses the possibilities of markets delegation inside regional railway networks. We estimate economies of scale at a disagregated level, the only one that is now relevant for studying European railway markets. Our results show that economies of scale do not justify the monopoly of a sole railway undertaking on a whole regional network, given the expected benefit of competition. We propose to deintegrate the regional networks while taking into account the network effects (interconnection costs), the contestability of the delegated markets (informational rents) and the market organization (transactional costs). (Author's abstract)

Keywords: economies of scale; natural monopoly; networks; railways; regional trains; transport ferroviaire; TER; rendements d'échelle; monopole naturel; réseaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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