Endogenous efforts on communication networks under strategic complementarity

Mohamed Belhaj () and Frédéric Deroïan ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination in order to reduce the social dilemma.

Keywords: Communication Network; Endogenous Efforts; Strategic Complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-17
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00339159v1
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Journal Article: Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity (2010)
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