Pourquoi les allocations chômage décroissent-elles avec la durée du chômage? Une revue de la littérature

Ophélie Cerdan ()
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Ophélie Cerdan: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: It is a synthesis of theoretical work explaining why the unemployment benefit is decreasing with the length of unemployment. We present various arguments in favor of degression within a single theoretical structure. We distinguish three arguments. The gradual decrease is the temporal profile best suited to reduce the disincentives to job search. Moreover, it appears as the choice politically expected because it is consistent with the preferences of the electorate majority. Finally, it presents itself as an instrument of controlling abuse of the system. Indeed, it serves to deter cheaters or those who claim to compensation even though they do not want to work.

Keywords: Moral hazard; adverse selection; median voter; sequential search of employment; Risque moral; sélection adverse; électeur médian; recherche séquentielle d'emploi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00533849
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