When Expert Advice Fails to Reduce the Productivity Gap: Experimental Evidence from Chess Players

Elias Bouacida (), Renaud Foucart and Maya Jalloul
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Elias Bouacida: UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis, LED - Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis
Maya Jalloul: LUMS - Lancaster University Management School - Lancaster University

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Abstract: We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chess players. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation following advice from a high or a lower-ability player. Although high-quality advice has the potential to serve as a "great equalizer,'' reducing the difference between higher- and lower-ability players, it did not happen in our experiment. One reason is that lower-ability players tend to pay a higher premium by sticking to their initial evaluation rather than following high-quality advice.

Keywords: expert; advice; chess; control; productivity gap; decreasing differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03-25
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