La rationalité économique de la distinction ex post / ex ante en matière de concurrence et de régulation dans le secteur numérique

Frédéric Marty

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The interplay between ex ante and ex post intervention in the European rules for digital markets can be seen in three ways. The first relates to the timing of the exercise of competition controls, as shown by the case of merger control between the ex-ante notification mechanism and the possibility of ex post control. The second concerns how competition rules are enforced. Should they be based on pre-defined rules or on an ex-post balance of effects? The third issue we consider in this paper is the relationship between regulatory intervention and the activation of competition rules. We consider this question from the angle of law and economics in a highly specific context, that of the relationship between the various European regulations relating to the digital sector and EU antitrust law.

Keywords: digital economy; regulation; competition law; économie numérique; régulation; règles de concurrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11-13
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Working Paper: La rationalité économique de la distinction ex post / ex ante en matière de concurrence et de régulation dans le secteur numérique (2024)
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