Cognition and Extended (NSNX) Rational Choice: Come Early Results

Howard Margolis

No 305, Working Papers from Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago

Abstract: The paper describes three novel regularities in public choice games, tied to a Darwinian argument about rules that could be expected to govern social choice. Note: This is a revised version of this paper, originally titled "Two Tests For ‘NSNX’ Effects In Cooperation Experiments," and incorporates additional results.

Keywords: public choice; social choice; game theory; NSNX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:har:wpaper:0305

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