An Experimental Analysis of the Ultimatum Game: The Role of Competing Motivations

Lorand Ambrus-Lakatos () and Tamas Meszerics ()
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Lorand Ambrus-Lakatos: Department of Political Science Central European University
Tamas Meszerics: Department of Political Science Central European University

No 109, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our thesis by perturbing the Ultimatum Game in a way that emphasizes the force of self-interest considerations; the evidence we collected provides support for our thesis.

JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2001-11
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