The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

László Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers

No 421, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.

Keywords: dynamic solution; absorbing set; core; non-emptiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2004-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.core.hu/doc/dp/dp/mtdp0421.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.econ.core.hu:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2007)
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2003)
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:0421

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nora Horvath ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).