Do Policy-Makers Earmark to Constrain their Successors? The Case of Environmental Earmarking

Neva Novarro ()
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Neva Novarro: Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross

No 408, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines whether legislators earmark funds in order to constrain the spending of future legislators with different preferences. Specifically, panel data is used to estimate the probability a new environmental earmarking law is passed as a function of Democrats holding and subsequently losing majority control of the government. The results of this study do not support this hypothesis. In fact, Democrats with a large majority who subsequently lose this majority power following the next election are found to be less likely to earmark funds for the environment. One possible explanation for this finding may be that competing forces make it more difficult for Democrats to pass legislation earmarking funds for the environment in the years before losing power, even if they have an increased incentive to do so. However, further results of this paper do not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence suggests Democrats do not earmark strategically.

Keywords: public finance; earmarking; environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2004-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://hcapps.holycross.edu/hcs/RePEc/hcx/HC0408-Novarro_Earmarking.pdf Preliminary version, November 2003 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0408

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