Financial Mentality beyond Good and Evil

Peter Norberg ()
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Peter Norberg: Dept. of Business Administration, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 2004:12, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: The tacit morality plays a vital part of a culture. A particular morality is caused by the fact that particular social forces are needed to keep financial markets together. The mentality of financial markets has causes in the particular working conditions. A particular set of values of actors is likely to make financial markets work.

Which morality is formed? Abstract greed and the invisible hand play a part. Digitalisation promotes an amoral mentality, irresponsibility and estrangement. The superman of Nietzsche perceives that acts beyond good and evil disembed financial institutions. Brokers and traders often have training in neo-classical economics, promoting certain personal convictions. Brokers neglect dimensions of ethics beyond explicit rules.

Keywords: abstract greed; amorality; disembeddedness; financial markets; the invisible hand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004-09-18, Revised 2005-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-hpe
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