Cooperative Harvesting and Core Allocations in Fisheries

Hermann Bardarson ()
Additional contact information
Hermann Bardarson: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway

No 07/03, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: The use of renewable resources is examined as a cooperative production game, the focus here being on fisheries. It is shown how pooling and exchange of individual endowments may open for substitutions that generate greater efficiency. We introduce a sharing rule that complies with the core concept, applied to heterogeneous multi-species fisheries with transferable utility.

Keywords: Resource management; fisheries; heterogeneity; linear programming; cooperative games; core allocations; substitution possibilities; common property. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2003-05-07
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://ekstern.filer.uib.no/svf/2003/07-03.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:bergec:2003_007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kjell Erik Lommerud ().