Quota and Risk Sharing among Fishermen

Hermann Bardarson ()
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Hermann Bardarson: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen

No 14/03, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Pooling and exchange of random resources may offer the owners insurance and substitution. Greater efficiency and more stable revenues thereby obtain. These good properties derive from a sharing rule that complies with the core concept from cooperative production games. It is applied here to fisheries with stochastic yield.

Keywords: Resource management; randomization; risk; insurance; cooperative games; core allocations; mutual exchange; stochastic programming; communal fisheries. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2003-12-28
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:bergec:2003_014

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