Strategic markets in property rights without price-takers

Odd Godal ()
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Odd Godal: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway

No 05/05, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Cournot-type models of markets in property rights typically feature strategists–acting at a first stage–followed by the move of a non-empty marketclearing competitive fringe. So, which agents can presumably be assigned the price-taking role? When simulating the upcoming medium-sized market for greenhouse gas emissions permits under the Kyoto Protocol, no answer to this question stands out as satisfactory. As an escape, trade is instead construed as a two-stage noncooperative cooperative game in which all agents act on both stages, allowing everyone to be a strategist.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; competitive fringe; market games; property rights; emissions trading; Kyoto Protocol. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D51 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2005-04-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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