NONCOOPERATIVE vs MINIMUM-RATE COMMODITY TAXATION

Morten Hvidt and Søren Nielsen
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Morten Hvidt: University of Copenhagen, Postal: Economic Policy Research Unit, University of Copenhagen

No 17-2000, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper demonstrates, within a simple two-country model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping, that the tax revenue (welfare) effects of a minimum tax requirement depend crucially on the character of the initial noncooperative tax equilibrium, i.e. whether it is Nash or Stackelberg.

Keywords: Commodity tax; Minimum rate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2000-10-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
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Related works:
Journal Article: Non‐cooperative vs. Minimum‐Rate Commodity Taxation (2001)
Journal Article: Non-cooperative vs. Minimum- Rate Commodity Taxation (2001)
Working Paper: Noncooperative vs. Minimum-Rate Commodity Taxation
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