Testing Game Theory

Jörgen Weibull

No 382, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects playing games in the laboratory violate such solution concepts as Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection. This claim is premature. What has been rejected are certain joint hypotheses about preferences, knowledge, and behavior. This note strives to clarify some issues in connection with laboratory experiments, from the viewpoint of non-cooperative game theory, and provides a sketch for a research program for experimental testing of game-theoretic solution concepts.

Keywords: Game theory; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 C70 C72 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2000-05-10, Revised 2002-04-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality. Essay in Honour of Werner Güth, Huck, S. (eds.), 2004, pages 85-104, Palgrave .

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