Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test

Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer

No 686, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

Keywords: Terrorism; Decentralization; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H40 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2007-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0686

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