The Wage Policy of a Firm when Recruitment is a Wage Dependent Poisson Process and Wages are Downward Rigid

Nils Henrik Schager
Additional contact information
Nils Henrik Schager: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

No 160, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: The paper contains an analysis of a firm's optimal wage and recruitment policy, when the dynamic labor supply to the firm is specified as a Poisson distributed flow of job-applicants, whose reservation wages are distributed in a fairly general way. Provided that the firm is not allowed to lower its wage level over time, it has recently been shown by the author that the optimal policy is to establish a constant wage level over future employment states. The paper explores the further properties of the optimal wage and its response to changes in the parameters of the decision problem.

Keywords: Recruitment; labour supply; optimal wage; wage rigidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1986-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp160.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0160

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().