Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games

Jörgen Weibull

No 489, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population(s). Some main features of this approach are here outlined, and connections with learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and equilibrium are discussed. Some desiderata and results for robust long-run predictions are considered.

Keywords: Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1997-10
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Journal Article: Evolution, rationality and equilibrium in games (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0489

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