Populist Parties’ Popularity Post Power

Andreas Bergh () and Anders Kärnä ()
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Andreas Bergh: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Postal: Stockholm, and Lund University, https://www.ifn.se/en/researchers/ifn-researcher/andreas-bergh/
Anders Kärnä: Sveriges Riksbank, Postal: and Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), https://www.ifn.se/en/researchers/affiliated-researchers/anders-karna/

No 1491, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Populist parties have grown rapidly in popularity in most European countries, and are increasingly common in government coalitions. Analyzing 183 populist parties in 33 European countries from 1980 to 2021, we estimate the average effect of being in government on election results. On average, we find a post-power penalty at about 6 percentage points for populist parties lose about in the election after being part of the government. The size of the post-power penalty does not vary with growth, inequality, social spending, globalization, or unemployment during their term. Our results suggest that populist parties thrive when they can channel voters’ negative sentiments without having the responsibility of governing.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Populism; Political parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2024-06-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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