Stress-Testing a Quasi-Market: Unintended Consequences of the Swedish School Voucher System

Andreas Bergh () and Joakim Wernberg ()
Additional contact information
Andreas Bergh: Department of Economics, Lund University, and, Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden, https://www.ifn.se/en/researchers/ifn-researcher/andreas-bergh/
Joakim Wernberg: Department of Technology and Society, Lund University, and, Postal: Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum, Stockholm, Sweden

No 1505, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Quasi-markets in the provision of public services are increasingly common but also highly contested. We formulate a conceptual framework based on economic theory to describe how quasi-markets differ from traditional markets in five aspects: 1) revenues, costs, and profits; 2) the matching of supply and demand; 3) competition; 4) structural change; and 5) rent-seeking. Using the assumption of profit-maximizing actors, we provide a stress test of quasi-market design and highlight how these differences affect incentives and expected outcomes. Applying the framework to the Swedish school voucher system, we show how design decisions have generated unintended consequences that are detrimental to service quality and run counter to policy goals.

Keywords: Quasi-Markets; School vouchers; Market structure; Public administration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 H52 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2024-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1505.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1505

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Elisabeth Gustafsson ().