EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Visibility as Labor Activation: Buyer-Facing Algorithms and Offline Execution in Online-to-Offline Platforms Visibility as Labor Activation: Buyer-Facing Algorithms and Offline Execution in Online-to-Offline Platforms Visibility as Labor Activation: Buyer-Facing Algorithms and Offline Execution in Online-to-Offline Platforms

Ying Fan (), Yuqi Fu () and Zan Yang ()
Additional contact information
Ying Fan: Department of Building and Real Estate. The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Hong Kong SAR, China
Yuqi Fu: School of Business. Soochow University. Suzhou, China
Zan Yang: Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of Technology, Postal: Teknikringen 10B, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden

No 26/1, Working Paper Series from Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance

Abstract: Online-to-offline platforms increasingly use buyer-facing visibility systems to allocate consumer attention, but transactions often remain dependent on human agents who execute offline work. This paper studies whether buyer-facing visibility also shapes the supply of offline execution capacity. We assemble high-frequency data from a large housing brokerage platform in Beijing that link daily listing visibility, traffic, agent participation, showing trips, closing-agent identities, and sale-related listing records. To estimate the effect of visibility-induced buyer attention, we use a listing-level mechanical rank-shock instrument based on the entry and exit of other properties above the focal listing in the relevant search set. The evidence shows that higher visibility-induced traffic mobilizes offline labor: listings attract more participating agents on the extensive margin and receive more showing trips from participating agents on the intensive margin. This labor expansion, however, does not translate into a systematically stronger observable closing agent, suggesting that visibility expands contest participation more than winner selection. We develop a model in which buyer-facing visibility raises agents' expected returns to offline execution, inducing entry and effort under fixed commission shares. Calibrated counterfactual simulations suggest that execution-aware visibility allocation can substantially improve platform outcomes: a marginal transaction-value rule raises platform transaction value by 36.9% while mobilizing 11.0% more participating agents, and a welfare-aware rule preserves similar value gains while tempering agent-participation expansion. The paper identifies cross-side labor effects of buyer-facing information systems and shows that recommendation design in online-to-offline platforms should account for offline executability.

Keywords: Platform visibility; recommendation systems; online-to-offline platforms; algorithmic management; offline execution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L86 M15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2026-06-22
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:2076299 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2026_001

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 10B, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cecilia Hermansson ().

 
Page updated 2026-07-08
Handle: RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2026_001