The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure

Hakan Holm

No 1999:008, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Our main conclusion is that the demand for information services that facilitate statistical screening between profitable and unprofitable sellers is highly sensitive to the market structure. A monopsonist will use information more extensively than would two or more buyers on the same market. We also show that information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will influence the demand on information. In equilibrium only the best information service will be used.

Keywords: Screening; Information Service; Market Behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1999-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
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Published in Journal of Economics, 2002, pages 155-183.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:1999_008

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