Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof

Lars-Gunnar Svensson

No 2002:17, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a fixed-price allocation mechanism is consistent with these presumptions. Miyagawa (2001) first proved this result. Here we give an alternative and comparatively short proof of the characterization result.

Keywords: Strategy-proof; Indivisible object; Housing market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2002-06-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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