Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion

Pär Torstensson
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Pär Torstensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

No 2005:37, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies (NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a dynamic model which supports the refinements.

Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Neutrally stable strategies; ascending NSS; Eroding NSS. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2005-05-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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