Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues

Irem Bozbay ()
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Irem Bozbay: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

No 2012:31, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals’ judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within individuals. Assuming strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting, we determine the voting rules which lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.

Keywords: judgment aggregation; private information; efficient information aggregation; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2012-11-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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