Divided We Act: The Role of Social Sanctions in a Polarized World

Eugen Dimant (), Michele Gelfand (), Anna Hochleitner () and Silvia Sonderegger ()
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Eugen Dimant: University of Pennsylvania, Postal: University of Pennsylvania, Penn, McNeil Buidling, Rm 438, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-3335, The United States of America, https://eugendimant.github.io/
Michele Gelfand: Stanford University, Postal: Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305, The United States of America, https://www.michelegelfand.com/
Anna Hochleitner: Centre for Applied Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Centre for Applied Research, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway, https://www.annahochleitner.com/
Silvia Sonderegger: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Postal: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, The United Kingdom, https://sites.google.com/site/silviasonderegger/home

No 7/2026, Discussion Paper Series in Economics from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics

Abstract: Social sanctions sustain social order by reinforcing widely accepted principles. Political polarization may weaken this mechanism by fragmenting these principles, yet causal effects are hard to identify: observational data cannot separate the effect of polarized preferences from exposure to polarization. We model theoretically and test experimentally the effectiveness of social sanctions in a representative U.S. sample (N = 2,400) that exogenously varies environmental polarization. Participants allocate money between politically opposed recipients privately and publicly, and public allocations can be punished by partisan Observers drawn from distributions varying in their degree of polarization. With greater polarization, public allocations become less equitable because participants (correctly) expect punishment even when acting fairly. This shows that polarization causally undermines the disciplining role of social sanctions.

Keywords: Equitable Behavior; Polarization; Sanctions; Social Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 81 pages
Date: 2026-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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