Revealed Normative Principles

Alexander W. Cappelen (), Shachar Kariv (), Erik O. Kimbrough (), Erik Ø. Sørensen (), Bertil Tungodden () and William R. Zame ()
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Alexander W. Cappelen: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway, https://sites.google.com/view/alexander-w-cappelen/home
Shachar Kariv: Dept. of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Postal: University of California, Berkeley, Department of Economics, 530 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880, USA, https://eml.berkeley.edu//~kariv/
Erik O. Kimbrough: Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, Chapman University, Postal: Chapman University, Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA, https://sites.google.com/site/erikkimbrough/
Erik Ø. Sørensen: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway, https://www.statsokonomen.no/about/
Bertil Tungodden: Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway, https://sites.google.com/view/bertiltungodden/home
William R. Zame: Dept. of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, Postal: UCLA, Department of Economics, ADDRESS 8283 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA, https://sites.google.com/view/williamzame/home

No 12/2026, Discussion Paper Series in Economics from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics

Abstract: When decision-makers allocate resources between anonymous others, with their own payoffs held constant, own-payoff utility maximization places no restriction on behavior; consistent structure in choices therefore reveals a normative principle. We employ a graphical budget line design to elicit allocations of real money between two anonymous others across many budget sets that vary the relative prices of redistribution. Choices overwhelmingly satisfy the axioms of rational choice, revealing individual normative principles. Subjects reveal a widely shared principle of impartiality (symmetric treatment of the two recipients) but hold heterogeneous views about the best symmetric allocation, ranging from Rawlsian equality to utilitarian efficiency.

Keywords: normative principles; distributive justice; impariality; equality; efficiency; revealed preference; constant elasticity of substitution; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2026-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hpe
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