Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games

Atle Seierstad ()
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Atle Seierstad: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway

No 19/2011, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper yields sufficient conditions for Pareto inoptimality of controls forming Nash equilibria in differential games. In Appendix a result on existence of open loop Nash equilibria is added.

Keywords: Differential games; Nash equilibria; Pareto improvements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2011-09-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2011_019

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