Income Taxation and Ability Rank
Thomas Aronsson () and
Olof Johansson-Stenman ()
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Thomas Aronsson: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden, https://www.umu.se/handelshogskolan
Olof Johansson-Stenman: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, https://www.gu.se/
No 1031, Umeå Economic Studies from Umeå University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
A substantial body of empirical and theoretical research suggests that individuals care about, and derive instrumental benefits from, their rank in society. This paper extends the Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation to a framework where individuals derive utility from their perceived ability rank. Such concerns generate externalities that tend to increase the optimal marginal tax rates for both corrective and redistributive reasons. While empirical evidence on the magnitude of these concerns is limited, their potential impact on optimal income taxation could be substantial, with top marginal income tax rates potentially exceeding 90%.
Keywords: Redistributive taxation; ability; ordinal comparisons; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 D90 H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2024-12-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pub, nep-res and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:umnees:1031
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