On the Existence of Nash-stable Partition in Leader's Coalition Games

Vasily Gusev () and Iakov Zhukov ()
Additional contact information
Vasily Gusev: National Research University Higher School of Economics
Iakov Zhukov: National Research University Higher School of Economics

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates two approaches to determining the leader of a coalition partition: the individual and the collective. In the first approach, each coalition in the partition chooses a representative, and then the leader is chosen from among all the representatives. In the second approach, the leading coalition in the partition is chosen, and then the leader from among members of that coalition is chosen. The leader and the leading coalition are chosen with a certain probability, which is guided by the weight rule or the ranking rule. Both approaches can be encountered in contests, sports competitions, and political elections. The paper delivers results on the existence of Nash-stable partitions depending on the approach and the probability of determining the leader. Cases where the number of coalitions in the partition is fixed and arbitrary are studied. The existence of an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies is proved for the collective approach and the weight rule, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash-stable partition to exist were found for the ranking rule. The sufficient conditions for a Nash-stable partition to exist were found for the individual approach and the corresponding probabilistic rules

Keywords: coalitionformation; leaderproblem; Nashstability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, October 2024, pages 1-42

Downloads: (external link)
https://wp.hse.ru/data/2024/10/13/1938203012/268EC2024.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:268/ec/2024

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamil Abdulaev () and Shamil Abdulaev ().