A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation

Chuansheng Wang, Fulei Shi, Cuiyou Yao and Basil K. Papadopoulos

Journal of Mathematics, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-8

Abstract: In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jjmath:6621331

DOI: 10.1155/2020/6621331

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